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WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
NOTES
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF STATE
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION STATUTES
One answer of the Federal Government to the acute unemployment
problem which had confronted the nation during the depression years
was the Social Security Ad of 1935.1 Two titles of the Ad relate directly
to unemployment benefits. Title III authorizes the essential federal ap-
propriations, while Title IX imposes a federal tax upon those employers
who do not fall within the enumerated exceptions. The proceeds of this
tax are paid like other internal revenue collections. However, should
the taxpayer make contributions to an unemployment fund under a
state law, he is allowed a credit of not more than ninety per cent of the
federal tax. General control of the Ad is administered by the Social Se-
curity Board which is given power to establish standards of operation,
and to approve the state laws under which the government will make
credit allowances to employers contributing to a state fund.2 Thus it
may be seen that the Ad contemplates a coordinated state and federal
plan, directed toward alleviating the effects of wide-spread unemploy-
ment.3
1Act of August 14, 1935, Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620, 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 3o-1307 (Supp.
1939).
2Section 9o3 provides that the Social Security Board shall approve any state law
which it finds provides that:
(i) All compensation is paid through such agencies as the Board may approve;
(2) No compensation is payable within two years of the first period with respect
to which contributions are required.
(3) All money received is payable to the Secretary of the Treasury to the credit
of the Unemployment Trust Fund;
(4) All money withdrawn shall be used solely in the payment of compensation;
(5) Compensation shall not be denied an individual for refusing to accept new
work under an enumerated list of conditions;
(6) The rights, privileges, and immunities conferred by the Act exist subject to
the power of legislative repeal or amendment.
'Prior to the passage of the Act, few states had imposed taxes for unemployment
insurance (Wisconsin, 1931, California, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New
York, 1935) because of the economic disadvantage to their commerce in competition
with that of states which did not have this type of tax.
Douglas, J., in Buckstaff Bath House Co. v. McKinley, 6o S. Ct. 279, 282 (1939):
... under the coordinated scheme which the act visualizes, when Congress brought
within its scope various classes of employers it in practical effect invited the states
to tax the same classes. Hence, if there were any doubt as to the jurisdiction of
the states to tax any of those classes it might well be removed by that invitation, for,
in the absence of a declaration to the contrary, it would seem to be a fair presump-
[Vol. I
NOTES
Influenced 4 by the provision for a federal tax credit to employers
coming within the provision of the National Ad, the legislatures of the
several states quickly adopted 5 corrollary Ads complying with the re-
quirements of the Social Security Board. 6
Employers who were opposed to payments thereunder first attacked
the whole plan as unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court of the
United States upheld the constitutionality, both of the Federal A% and
of the complementary state laws. 7 The opponents of the plan then
sought to avoid payments by a showing that they did not fall within
the scope of the employment relationships adopted by the state laws.
It is to this latter phase of litigation that the present inquiry is directed.
At the outset it must be borne in mind that the common law rela-
tionships of master and servant, principal and agent, and hirer and
independent contractor have different connotations and that the terms
employer and employee may be given diverse interpretations.8 Confu-
sion in distinguishing between them has arisen because of a tendency
on the part of some courts and writers to use the terms "servant" and
"agent" interchangeably, and because of the lack of a definite stand-
ard by which to define the scope of the term "independent contractor."
In a strict sense "agent" denotes a commercial relationship while
"servant" refers to the manual or "service proper" relations, the dis-
tinction being chiefly in the degree of control exercised by the "master."9
Many tests have been resorted to in an effort to define an independent
contractor relationship, 10 but the most realistic approach to the prob-
tion that the purpose of Congress was to have the state law as closely coterminious
as possible with its own. To the extent that it was not, the hopes for a coordinated
and integrated dual system would not materialize."
'The term "coerce" has been in ill repute since the decision of Stewart Machine
Co. v. Davis, 3o U. S. 548, 57 S. Ct. 883, 81 L. ed. 1279, io9 A. L. R. 1293 (1937).
"By August 16, 1937, all states and territories and the District of Columbia had
passed unemployment compensation laws, covering more than. 21ooo,ooo workers.
OSupra, note 2.
7Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co., 3o U. S. 495, 57 S. Ct. 868, 8x L. ed.
1245, iog A. L. R. 1327 (1937) upheld the constitutionality of the Alabama Act;
Helvering v. Davis, 3oi U. S. 619, 57 S. Ct. 904, 81 L. ed. 1307, 1o9 A. L. R. 1319
(1937) upheld the Federal Social Security Act; Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 3o U. S.
548, 57 S. Ct. 883, 81 L. ed. 1279, 1o9 A. L. R. 1293 (1937) upheld the Federal Social
Security Act. And see Howes Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts Unemployment Compensa-
tion Commission, 5 N. E. (2d) 720 (Mass. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U. S. 657, 57 S. Ct.
434, 8i L. ed. 867 (1937) upheld the Massachusetts Act.
'Restatement, Agency (1933) § 220, comment c.
'American Say. Life Ins. Co. v. Riplinger, 249 Ky. 8, 6o S. W. (2d) 115 (1933); Re-
statement, Agency (1933) § 220, comment c.
"°The test most relied upon has been "who had the right of control?" The weak-
ness of this test, it has been argued, lies in the fact that it first necessitates a declara-
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lem is taken by the Restatement of Agency which enumerates a list of
factors to be considered in determining whether one is a servant or an
independent contractor.1"
The unemployment compensation statutes under which questions
of an employer's tax liability have arisen may be classified broadly into
two major types. Under the first type, which the courts have interpreted
as affording a maximum coverage, decisions increase the tax burden by
extending the benefits of unemployment compensation to a class of em-
ployees who under the tests applied at common law might be termed
"independent contractors." Statutes of the second type have been inter-
preted as having a more limited scope, thus restricting the benefits to
that group of employees qualifying as common law "servants." This
diversity of interpretations, as will be subsequently shown, is due to a
fundamental difference in the various statutes, and to a tendency on
the part of the courts to define the employer and employee relation-
ships for tax purposes by recourse to inapt decisions in unrelated
fields.12
tion of the relationship, and then an assertion that the defendant did or did not
have control. Leidy, Salesmen as Independent Contractors (193o) 28 Mich. L. Rev.
365. More helpful has been the entrepreneur theory, under which liability is imposed
upon him who has in fact assumed the risk of profit and loss in the enterprise. In-
dicative of the entrepreneur are: (a) control, the ability to formulate and execute
policies, (b) ownership, legal title to the property used in the performance of the
production or marketing functions of the enterprise, (c) chance of profit and risk of
loss. The party having the majority of these attributes is the entrepreneur. Douglas,
Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk (1929) 38 Yale L. J. 584.
"Restatement, Agency (1933) § 220 (2): "In determining whether one acting for
another is a servant or an independent contractor, the following matters of fact,
among others, are considered: (a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the
master may exercise over the details of the work; (b) whether or not the one em-
ployed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation,
with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the di-
rection of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d) the skill required
in the particular occupation; (e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (f) the
length of time for which the person is employed; (g) the method of payment, whether
by the time or by the job; (h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular busi-
ness of the employer; and (i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating
the relationship of master and servant."
"As precedents for their decisions the courts have relied upon cases arising in
the field of tort liability and those arising under the workmen's compensation acts.
It should be noticed, however, that in these cases the employment relationships in-
volved are defined in common law terminology. In Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132
U. S. 518, 10 S. Ct. 175, 33 L. ed. 44o (1899), a salesman was held to be a servant and
not an independent contractor, hence the employer was held liable for torts com-
mitted in the course of the salesman's employment.
In Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown, 93 F. (2d) 870 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938), an oil com-*
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Illustrative of the broad type of statute is the unemployment com-
pensation act which was passed by the legislature of the State of Wash-
ington 13 pursuant to the provisions of the National Social Security
Ac. 1 4 The employment upon which the excise is levied is defined as:
"... service ... performed for wages or under any contract
of hire, written or oral, express or implied. . . . Services per-
formed by an individual for remuneration shall be deemed to
be employment subject to this act unless it is shown to the satis-
faction of the director that:
"(i) Such individual has been and will continue to be free
from control or direction over the performance of such service,
both under his contract of services and in fact; and15
"(ii) Such service is either outside the usual course of the
business for which such service is performed, or that such service
pany was held liable for the negligence of its distributing agent. The distributor
owned all the equipment and paid all of the expenses of conducting his business,
but was held to be a servant because an examination of the contract with the oil
company showed that a substantial degree of control over his activities was exercised
by the company. Contra: (minority) Greaser v. Appaline Oil Co., iog W. Va. 396,
155 S. E. 170 (1930).
In Bohanon v. James McClatchy Pub. Co., 16 Cal. App. (2d) 188, 6o P. (2d) 51o
(1936), a publisher was held not liable for the tort of a distributor who bought
newspapers from the publisher and sold them to subscribers along a prescribed route
even though the publisher had the right to take over the management of the route
at any time the distributor might prove unsatisfactory. The court held that this re-
striction merely assured a satisfactory quality of work, and that complete, unquali-
fied control determines the master-servant relationship. Contra: Schmitt v. American
Press, 42 S. W. (2d) 969 (Mo. App. 1931).
In Mountain Meadow Creameries v. Industrial Accident Comm., 25 Cal. App.
(2d) 123, 76 P. (2d) 724 (1938), the widow of a dairy distributor was held not en-
titled to workmen's compensation insurance. It was shown that deceased was as-
signed an exclusive territory, required to sell only the company's products therein
from trucks of an approved body and color design. The contract between the parties
was terminable immediately for an enumerated list of causes. The court held that
these restrictions merely assured a satisfactory performance of the contract and that
they were not so detailed as to indicate a master-servant relationship. Contra: Press
Pub. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm. of California, igo Cal. 114, 21o Pac. 82o (1922),
wherein a newspaper distributor was held entitled to workmen's compensation in-
surance; McDermott's Case, 283 Mass. 4, 186 N. E. 231 (1933), in which a journey-
man steam fitter was held entitled to workmen's compensation insurance. Glielmi v.
Netherland Dairy Co., 254 N. Y. 60, 171 N. E. 906 (ig3o), where a dairy salesman was
held entitled to workmen's compensation insurance upon a showing that he bought
milk products from the company and resold to customers along a prescribed route.
He was required to hire the company's wagons, and to permit the company's repre-
sentative to ride with him at any time to supervise the handling of the route. The
contract was terminable at the pleasure of the company. The court held that he was
a servant even though the contract was framed to suggest a different relation.
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is performed outside of all of the places of business of the enter-
prises for which such service is performed; and16
"(iii) Such individual is customarily engaged in an indepen-
dently established trade, occupation, profession or business, of
the same nature as that involved in the contract of service."'17
By establishing this statutory test which requires the concurrence
of these three essential items in order to entitle the employer to an ex-
emption from the social security tax, it is apparent that the legislature
intended the concept of employment to be more inclusive than a mere
master and servant relationship. The Supreme Court of the State of
Washington adopted such an interpretation in the case of McDermott
v. State's when it held that barbers employed under oral lease agree-
ments19 were "employees" within the meaning of the At. The court
argued that it was unnecessary to decide whether or not the barbers
were "servants" ". . . because the parties are brought within the purview
of the unemployment compensation act by a definition more inclusive
than that of master and servant." 20
Construing similar statutes, the courts of other jurisdictions have
been equally astute in making this differentiation between the statutory
definition of employment and the common law concepts designated by
the same words. Thus it has been held in Colorado 2' and North Caro-
"'Italics supplied.
17Washington, Laws of 1937, Ch. 162, § 19(g), p. 6og.
8s196 Wash. 261, 82 P. (2d) 568 (1938), hereafter referred to as the McDermott
case.
1OIt was shown that at the time the National Industrial Recovery Act became ef-
fective the plaintiff, who held himself out as owner of the shop, entered into oral
lease agreements with his barbers. Under these agreements each was "leased" a chair
and the necessary barbering equipment in consideration of a percentage of the
gross receipts from the services performed on the chair. When any chair was tem-
porarily vacated by the original "lessee" the lease was suspended. A barber working
at- a less advantageously located chair might move to the vacant one thus making
effective a new lease between himself and the plaintiff. These arrangements were
terminable by either party upon a week's notice, and under certain conditions by
the plaintiff without notice.
21196 Wash. 261, 82 P. (2d) 568, 570 (1938): "We are clear that the so-called oral
lease agreements are, in fact, contracts of service within the meaning of the act. To
hold otherwise would be to ignore the realities of the case as disclosed by the ...
[plaintiff's] ... own testimony." It is of interest to note that no cases were cited in
the opinion.
2Industrial Commission v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 88 P. (2d)
56o (Coo. 1939). In this case it appeared that the company assigned its general agents
to exclusive territories. These agents in turn contracted with district or special agents
who subsequently contracted with the various soliciting agents. A general control
was exercised over these agents by requiring them to observe certain "Rules and In-
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lina22 that insurance agents were "employees" and entitled to unem-
ployment compensation. And the Utah Supreme Court has held that
a commission agent was within the purview of the Utah A&.23 Although
the New York Ac 24 does not establish a list of requirements which must
be met in order to exempt an employer from tax payments, its opera-
tion was extended to common law "independent contractors" when the
structions" in the issuance of policies, and by prohibiting full time agents from en-
tering other lines of business except with the consent of the company. Each contract
denied that a master and servant relationship had been established with the com-
pany. Disregarding this provision, the court held that the company was not exempt
from the act since it had not shown a concurrence of the three conditions which the
legislature considered essential for an exemption. Accord: Equitable Life Insurance
Co. of Iowa v. Industrial Commission, 95 P. (2d) 4 (Coo. 1939).
2-Unemployment Compensation Commission of N. C. v. Jefferson Standard Life
Insurance CO., 215 N. C. 479, 2 S. E. (2d) 584 (1939). Therein an insurance company,
which required its agents to devote their full time to their duties, and to issue poli-
cies in accordance with the company's instruction, was held not to be able to qualify
under the three requirements for an exemption. "The clear and unequivocal mean-
ings of those [statutory] definitions are strongly indicative of legislative intent ...
to disregard a number of the neat categories of the common law .... Although the
extent of the area encompassed by some of the definitions may cause surprise, the
duty of this Court is to expound and to interpret the law as it is given to us, not to
redraft it along lines which may seem to us more conservative and more desirable."
2 S. E. (2d) 584, 590- (Italics supplied.)
2Globe Grain and Milling Co. v. Industrial Commission, 9i P. (2d) 512 (Utah
1939). In this case the company for which the agent sold products furnished him
with stationery, order books, and samples. It also made advances when the agent sold
to customers with good credit, and at times collected overdue accounts. The agent
furnished his own display room and kept his own hours. The contract was terminable
at the will of either party. In holding that this company had not qualified for ex-
emption under the statutory test, the court declared that it was not bound by a
strict common law definition of "independent contractors." "The most independent
of independent contractors ... are not included in the class of individuals entitled
to benefits, but a class of individuals, who under strict common law concept of in-
dependent contratorship were other than employees, are entitled. We need not draw
the line. It is drawn for us by the act." 91 P. (2d) 512, 514 (Utah 1939). Upon pe-
tition for rehearing, 97 P. (2d) 582 (Utah 1939) the court said of the quotation just
given: "The language was merely illustrative, but we delete it so as to avoid con-
fusion .... Since the act applies to a new field of law which has its own glossary and
defines the relationships to which it applies, the introduction of old concepts which
fitted into the conceptual pattern of tort liability carried over into this field may
only be confusing." (Italics supplied.)
2
1Ch. 32, Labor Law (Ch. 31 of the Consolidated Laws), Art. 18, § 502, as amended
June 1939, Ch. 662 § i: "'Employment,' except where the context shows otherwise,
means any employment under any contract of hire, express or implied, written or
oral, including all contracts entered into by helpers and assistants of employees,
whether paid by the employer or employee, if employed with the knowledge actual
or constructive of the employer, in which all or the greater part of the work is to be
performed within this state."
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court held that industrial home workers25 and news carriers26 were em-
ployees within its terms. Surprisingly, the Washington State Supreme
Court has not considered that it was bound by its prior decision in the
McDermott case. That decision was not only in effect overruled in the
case of Washington Recorder Publishing Co. v. Ernest,27 but the court
went further and substituted a wholly different test to be used in estab-
lishing the existence of an employer and employee relationship. In de-
ciding that news carriers were "independent contractors" and not "em-
ployees" 28 within the meaning of the act, the majority of the court
argued that the statute merely established a guide and that the legisla-
ture really intended to include only common law "servants" within its
scope.29 In support of its decision the court quoted verbatim that com-
2Andrews v. Commodore Knitting Mills, 257 App. Div. 515, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 577
(1939). In this case the company sent raw materials to various home workers to-
gether with a statement of the price which would be paid for the finished garments.
The other equipment was furnished by the workers. Finished garments which met
the company's inspection were bought from the workers at the predetermined prices.
The court held that these workers were employees within the meaning of the act
since a sufficient control was exercised by the company to establish an employer-
employee relationship.
6Matter of Scatola v. Bronx Home News Pub. Co., 257 App. Div. 471, 14 N. Y. S.
(2d) 55 (1939)- Therein a route carrier who delivered papers to subscribers of the pub-
lishing company was held to be an employee and not an independent contractor. It
was shown that his deliveries were made over a prescribed route to subscribers whose
names were furnished by the company. The carrier made an initial deposit for his
papers and at the end of each week paid the company's inspector for the papers
which he had delivered. His compensation was the difference between the price of
the papers to him, and the sale price to the customers. The contract was terminable
at the will of the company. "The relation between this carrier and publisher differs
from that of a newsboy who purchases papers and sells them on the street corner
through crying his wares. While this carrier paid the ... [coirpany's] ... inspector
for the papers which he had delivered, his ownership was qualified, as they could be
used only in fulfilling the publisher's contract with its subscribers and in furthering
the effort of the publisher to obtain new subscribers. In determining whether a per-
son is an independent contractor or an employee, the authorities deem the right to
'hire' and 'fire' of great importance." 257 App. Div. 471, 472.
71 9 Wash. 176, 91 P. (2d) 78 (1939). Of the four justices who comprised the
majority only two had been on the bench when the decision in the McDermott case
had been rendered. Simpson, J. concurred in the decisions of both cases. Geraghty,
J. who had written the opinion in the McDermott case, concurred in the result in
the second case. The only mention made of the McDermott case in the majority
opinion concerns the right to bring this action under the declaratory judgments act.
'-The contract involved was the familiar "carrier contract" whereby the pub-
lisher "sold" the papers to the newsboy who in turn "resold" them to the publisher's
subscribers. The publisher assigned exclusive routes and supervised the handling of
accounts. The contract was terminable at the will of the publisher.
2The opinion states that the items in the statutory test do ".. . not differ from
the test employed at the common law and by this court in determination of the
question whether the relationship is that of employee or independent contractor.
[Vol. I
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ment of the Restatement of Agency which was favorable to its posi-
tion.30 Had the court read a paragraph further it would have found
that "... The context and purpose of the particular statute controls the
meaning [of the term "servant"] which is frequently not that which the
same word bears in the Restatement of this subject."13 1 By this process
of judicial legislation the court, violating the well-established rule of
statutory interpretation that the legislative definition must prevail,32
held that a concurrence of the three items in the statutory definition of
"employment" was not essential for exemption under the Ad. Since the
purpose of this broad statutory definition was to prevent the evasions
which arise from the refined distinctions attendant upon common law
concepts, 33 it would appear that the decision merely raised additional
problems of tax avoidance.
In contrast to the broad statutes of the Washington type are those
which correspond to the unemployment compensation acts of Connec-
ticut 34 and Kentucky.35 The employment upon which the Connecticut
excise is based is defined as ".... any service.., performed under any
express or implied contract of hire creating the relationship of master
and servant." 36 The Connecticut court in Northwestern Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Tone37 held that insurance agents hired under a con-
... In the enactment of the Unemployment Compensation Statute the legislature se-
lected or picked out three elements to be considered. The legislature did not say, nor
is the language capable of that interpretation, that each of those elements must exist
one hundred percent in order to establish the relationship of independent contrac-
tor. Surely, the legislature did not intend to establish a different rule than that which
has heretofore been employed by this court. To hold otherwise would be to, in effect,
eliminate the relationship of independent contractor." 199 Wash. 176, 91 P. (2d) 718,
724 (1939)-
wRestatement, Agency (1933) § 220, comment a, b, c.
='Restatement, Agency (1933) § 220, comment d. (Italics supplied.)
mFox v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 294 U. S. 87, 55 S. Ct. 333, 79 L. ed. 780 (1934);
Emery Bird Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Williams, 98 F. (2d) 66, 170 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938),
"It is a general rule that where a statute defines the meaning of words used therein,
the statutory definition must prevail, regardless of what other meaning may be at-
tributable to it by other authorities, or even by common understanding"; Taran v.
United States, 88 F. (2d) 54 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937); State v. City of Des Moines, 266
N. W. 41, 42 (Iowa 1936), "In defining terms as applied to any given act, the legis-
lature is its own lexicographer"; Unemployment Compensation Commission v. City
Ice and Coal Co., 216 N. C. 6, 3 S. E. (2d) 290 (1939).
23This point was argued by Blake, C. J. in his vigorous dissenting opinion in
which he urged the court to adhere to its decision in the McDermott case.
3'Connecticut, General Statutes, Supp. 1937, Ch. 28oa.
!Kentucky Statutes, 1939 Supp., § 4748g- 1 et seq.; Acts of 1936, 4th Extraordi-
nary session, Ch. 7, as continued and replaced by Acts of 1938, Ch. 5o.
2'Connecticut, General Statutes, Supp. 1937, Ch. 28oa, § 8o3d. (Italics supplied.)
3.125 Conn. 183, 4 A. (2d) 640, 121 A. L. R. 993 (1939).
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tract which subjected them to a substantial degree of control38 were not
"servants" within the statutory meaning. It has been thought, however,
that because of the company regulations which govern the issuance of
policies and the division of territories, and the company prohibition
forbidding agents to engage in other business activities except with ex-
press permission, the agents qualified as "servants" within the restrictive
language of the act.39 A subsequent decision by the same Connecticut
court in Jack and Jill, Inc. v. Tone4° would indicate that where the con-
tract of employment merely creates the appearance of an independent
contractor relationship, the "master" will not be exempt from tax lia-
bility. That case presented a situation in which an ice cream company
sought to avoid payment of the tax by "selling" its products to its truck
drivers who in turn "resold" to customers along a prescribed route. It
was shown that at the end of each day's deliveries the "unsold" ice
cream was returned to the company for full credit, that the drivers were
required to "borrow" the company's trucks, and that they were required
to permit the company's inspectors to supervise the management of
the routes. In reaching its decision the court rightly held that since the
drivers had no substantial discretion as to manner of performance of
their services, they were mere "servants." It seems unfortunate, how-
ever, that the court, in defining the relationships which arose in an
entirely unrelated field of law, sought recourse to the common law con-
cepts of "servant" and "independent contractor."
41
The Unemployment Compensation Law of Kentucky differs from
the restrictive Connecticut Ad in several important particulars. In the
first place, the law specifically provides that "This At shall be liberally
construed to accomplish the purposes thereof." 42 Secondly, "'Covered
employment' means service performed for wages or under contract of
hire in which the relationship of the individual performing such ser-
vices and the employing unit for which such services are rendered is,
as to those services, the legal relationship of employer and employee." 43
3"For a fuller discussion of the contract see Industrial Commission v. Northwest-
ern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 88 P. (2d) 56o (Colo. 1939), supra note 21.
"Commenting upon this decision, in the case of Industrial Commission v. North-
western Mutual Life Insurance Co., 88 P. (2d) 56o, 567 (Colo. 1939), supra, note 21,
the court said: ".... a reading of the opinion in the Connecticut case will disclose
that the Supreme Court there placed a rather strained construction on the relation-
ship of master and servant as applied to its Unemployment Compensation Act."
409 A. (2d) 497 (Conn. 1939).
4
1See Globe Grain and Milling Co. v. -Industrial Commission (on rehearing) 97
P. (2d) 582 (Utah 1939), supra note 23.
"Kentucky Statutes, 1939 Supp., § 4748g-21.




The Kentucky court in construing this statute apparently has adopted
a construction as narrow as that of the Connecticut decisions.
In the Kentucky case, the Indian Refining Company asked for a
declaration of its rights under the above act, and that it be adjudged
that a distributing agent was not an employee within the statutory defi-
nition. The Kentucky court in Barnes v. Indian Refining Co.44 held
that this agent was an "independent contractor" and not within the
class of persons benefited by the Ad. In reaching such a conclusion the
court seemed to be influenced by these considerations: first, the control
exercised by the oil company was directed merely towards results and
not details; second, even though the legislature said that the act was to
be liberally construed it did not mean that its operation was to be ex-
tended to persons not within its letter; third, the act is a taxing statute
and should be construed most strongly against the taxing power; fourth,
one of the company's agents was a corporation and it is clearly apparent
that the legislature did not intend to include within the scope of the
Ad services rendered by corporations. 45
It seems unfortunate that this erroneous decision was considered as
controlling in another jurisdiction.46 In the first place, it was shown,
and it has often been held,4 7 that the oil company exercised a substan-
tial degree of control over the distributing agent. Secondly, it is difficult
to see how a statute of this nature can be "liberally construed to accom-
plish the purposes thereof" without extending its benefits to a larger
class of persons than is embraced within the common law concept of
"servant." Thirdly, this legislative declaration for liberality of construc-
tion should take precedence over the canon of interpretation that ex-
cises should be construed in favor of the taxpayer. And lastly, while the
"280 Ky. 8ni, 134 S. W. (2d) 62o (1939).
",In Texas Co. v. Wheeless, 187 So. 880 (Miss. 1939) construing a similar contract
under a similar statute, the court held that a consignment agent was without the
provisions of the act. Apparently the court was influenced by the facts that: (i) this
was an excise tax and hence should be construed most strongly against the taxing
power, (2) many of the consignment agents were corporations, and (3) "employment"
should be interpreted in its ordinary sense. Accord: American Oil Co. v. Wheeless,
187 So. 889 (Miss. 1939).
45Indian Refining Co. v. Dallman, 8 U. S. L., Week 441 (S. D. Ill. 1940).
"Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown, 93 F. (2d) 870 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938), and cases therein
cited. For a complete discussion of the consignment contracts and the control which
the petroleum companies exercise over their distribution agents and gasoline station
operators see, Gulf Refining Co. v. Fox, 11 F. Supp. 425 (S. D. W. Va. 1935) aff'd 297
U. S. 381, 56 S. Ct. 510 , 80 L. ed .731; Ashland Refining Co. v. Fox, 11 F. Supp. 431
(S. D. W. Va. 1935), aff'd, 297 U. S. 381, 56 S. Ct. 510, 8o L. ed. 731; Maxwell v. Shell
Eastern Pet. Prod. Co. Inc., 90 F. (2d) 39 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S.
715, 58 S. Ct. 24 (1937)-
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legislature admittedly did not intend to bring the services rendered by
a corporation within the Ad, such a reason has no bearing upon the
present case. The question to be determined here is whether or not con-
signment agents in their individual capacities are to be considered em-
ployees of the company. Moreover, it might well be shown that it was
the intention of the legislature, even though the consignment agent was
a corporation, to consider the employees of the corporate agent em-
ployees of the oil company within the meaning of the A.
At the present time a prediction regarding the trend of decisions
under either type of statute would be mere conjecture. A brief summary
of the past decisions might, however, serve as a guide. Where an ad-
mitted control has been exercised by the "employer" over the details
of the services sought to be included within the ambit of an unemploy-
ment compensation statute, the courts have held that the person per-
forming such services was entitled to the benefits of unemployment
compensation under either type of statute.48 Where it has been shown
that a substantial degree of control has been exercised by the employer,
but under a common law test an independent contractor relation can
be made out, cases arising under the narrow type of statute have held
that the individual performing the services under the contract was not
an "employee." 49 On the other hand, courts construing a broad statute
have held that an employment relationship subject to the At has been
established.5 0 Where no substantial degree of control could be shown,
the "employer" has been held not liable for tax payments under either
type of statute.51
It is argued that the primary cause of these inconsistent decisions is
"Jack and Jill, Inc. v. Tone, 9 A. (2d) 497 (Conn. 1930); McDermott v. State, 196
Wash. 261, 82 P. (2d) 568 (1938).
"Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Tone, 125 Conn. 183, 4 A. (2d) 640,
121 A. L. R. 993 (1939); Barnes v. Indian Refining Co., 28o Ky. 8xi, 134 S. W. (2d)
620 (1939); American Oil Co. v. Wheeless, 187 So. 889 (Mis . 1939); Texas Co. v.
Wheeless, 187 So. 88o (Miss. 1939).
"°Equitable Life Insurance Co. of Iowa v. Industrial Commission, 95 P. (2d) 4
(Colo. 1939); Industrial Commission v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 88
P. (2d) 560 (Colo. 1939); Andrews v. Commodore Knitting Mills, 257 App. Div. 515,
13 N. Y. S. (2d) 577 (1939); Matter of Scatola v. Bronx Home News Pub. Co. 257 App.
Div. 471, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 55 (1939); Unemployment Compensation Commission v.
Jefferson Standard Life Insurance CO., 215 N. C. 479, 2 S. E. (2d) 584 (1939). Contra:
Washington Recorder Pub. Co. v. Ernest, 199 Wash. 176, 91 P. (2d) 718 (1939).
"Probably the court which has been most liberal in its decision on this particular
point was the Utah court in Globe Grain and Milling Co. v. Industrial Commission,
91 P. (2d) 512 (Utah 1939). It will be noticed, however, that even there the attempt
was made to establish the control element in order to hold that the commission agent
was an employee within the meaning of the Utah Act.
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the failure of the various legislatures to define clearly the employment
relationships which they intended to include within the scope of the
Ads. This failure, coupled with the economic predilections of the sev-
eral courts,5 2 and their apparent inability to distinguish satisfactorily
between the relationships of master and servant, principal and agent,
and hirer and independent contractor, has unduly restricted the cov-
erage of many of the statutes. In view of the purpose for which the So-
cial Security Ad was passed, the fact that the older concepts of master
and servant arose in entirely different and unrelated fields, and the ease
with which evasions can be effected under an interpretation based upon
common law principles, it would seem that a liberal construction would
offer the better approach under either a broad or a narrow unemploy-
ment compensation statute. EMERY COX, JR.
THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF LAW
The problem of the corporate practice of law, though not a new
one in the courts,' has in recent years been receiving wide spread at-
tention due to the increased activities of trust companies and collection
agencies.2 The rapid increase in the number of trusts being adminis-
tered by banks and trust companies in the United States,3 each main-
taining a separate legal department with its own attorney-employee offi-
cers drafting various types of instruments which the lawyer has been
accustomed to designate as legal instruments, and the drafting of which
to the mind of the average attorney constitutes the "practice of law,"
r'See Unemployment Compensation Commission of N. C. v. Jefferson Standard
Life Insurance Co., 215 N. C. 479, 2 S. E. (2d) 584 (1939), supra note 22, and Stone, J.,
dissenting in Morehead v. People of the State of New York, 298 U. S. 587, 633, 56 S.
Ct. 918, 933, 8o L. ed. 1347 (1936).
'As early as Lord Coke's day it was the recognized doctrine that a corporation
could not appear "in person" by its officers or agents, who were not attorneys, in an
action against itself. i Coke On Litt. 66b.
2Otterbourg, Collection Agency Activities: The Problem From the Standpoint of
the Bar (1938) 5 Law and Contemp. Prob. 35, "There are now functioning in the
United States approximately four hundred twenty-nine committees on unauthorized
practice of law in addition to the National Committee of the American Bar Asso-
ciation."
3Encyc. of the Social Sciences (1935) 12,5, "In the year ending June 30, 1933, it
was reported by the comptroller of the currency that national banks were adminis-
tering over ioo,ooo individual trusts with assets aggregating over $6,oooooo,ooo and
were handling corporate trusts . . . aggregating over $So,ooo,ooo,ooo." See also i
Powell, Cases and Materials on Trusts and Estates (1932) 41-47.
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has furnished a major source of the litigation. Collection agencies have
likewise fallen under the ban against the corporate practice of the law
because, even though attorneys are hired by the agencies to collect
debts, such attorneys are answerable to the agencies rather than to the
creditor members upon whose claims suits are being brought.
A corporation, being an artificial entity which exists only in con-
templation of law, has neither the right nor the power to practice law.
4
The reasons assigned for excluding corporations from the practice of
law have regard to the special nature of the attorney's calling. The
practice of the legal profession calls for skill and knowledge, neces-
sarily involves the intimate and confidential relationship of trust and
confidence which exists between attorney and client, and is subject to
the power of the courts to use summary proceedings by disbarment or
otherwise, if necessary, to enforce on the part of the attorney observ-
ance of obligations and duties growing out of this relationship. The
courts hold that a corporation cannot adequately satisfy these consid-
erations.5 It is conceded that a corporation could comply with the pre-
requisite of skill and knowledge by hiring licensed attorneys to act for
it, but the cases uniformly hold that the practice of law by corporations
would be destructive of the relationship of trust and confidence be-
tween attorney and client 6 should the corporation intervene as an em-
ployer of attorneys.
7
The exclusion of corporations from the practice of law has been ef-
fected in various ways and upon differing theories. Courts in some
4
People v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 209 Pac. 363 (1922); Pacific
Employers' Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, io Cal. App. (2d) 592, 52 P. (sd) 992 (x935); Boykin
v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 51, 162 S. E. 796 (1932); In re Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust Co.,
49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157 (1930), 73 A. L. R. 1323 (1931); In re Otterness, 181 Minn.
254, 232 N. W. 318 (1930), 73 A. L. R. 1319 (1931); In re Co-operative Law Co., 198
N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15 (1gao), 139 Am. St. Rep. 839, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 55 (191), 19
Ann. Cas. 879.
TPeople v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 2o9 Pac. 363 (1922); In re
Shoe Manufacturers' Protective Ass'n, 3 N. E. (2d) 746 (Mass. 1936); People v. Title
Guarantee & Trust Co., 227 N. Y. 366, 125 N. E. 666 (1919), rev'g 18o App. Div. 648,
168 N. Y. S. 278 (1917); Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men v. Bar Ass'n of City of Rich-
mond, 167 Va. 327, 189 S. E. 153 (1937); State ex rel. Lundin v. Merchants' Protective
Corp., 1o5 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694 (1919).
'People v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 2o9 Pac. 363 (1922); United
States Title 8. Guaranty Co. v. Brown, 166 App. Div. 688, 152 N. Y. S. 470 (1915); In
re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15 (1910), 139 Am. St. Rep. 839, 32
L. R. A. (N. S.) 55 (1911), 19 Ann. Cas. 879; Montgomery v. Utilities Ins. Co., 117
S. W. (2d) 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); State ex rel. Lundin v. Merchants' Protective
Corp., 105 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694 (1919).
7See Jackson, The Establishment of Cordial Relations Between the Bar and the
Corporate Fiduciary (1938) 5 Law and Contemp. Prob. 8o.
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states have excluded corporations from law practice under the power
which "inheres" in courts to determine who shall practice law.8 Even
if the charter attempts to empower the corporation to engage in prac-
tice, the provision is held to be void because the practice of law is not
a business open to the public generally but is subject to the regulation
of the courts.9 Statutes which permit the organization of corporations
for the purpose of carrying on any business which an individual can
lawfully conduct do not give the corporation the right to practice law,
since the individual has no such right unless he complies with the re-
quirements set forth by the courts and the legislatures. A number of
states have forbidden the corporate practice of law by adopting special
statutes on the subject.10 Where this has been done, the courts uni-
formly uphold the statutes. It is only where the legislature attempts to
set a standard below that required by the court for the practice of law,
that a conflict arises. In such cases the legislative action of formulating
requirements is held by the courts as setting only a minimum standard,
and the courts may go above these requirements and apply higher
standards to those desiring to practice law.'1
"In re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N. E. 313 (1935); Compare:
Boykin v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 162 S. E. 796 (1932); In re Cannon, 2o6 Wis. 374,
24o N. W. 441 (1932); Ex parte Stackler, 179 La. 410, 154 So. 41 (1934), where the
same principle was applied to individual persons rather than to corporations.
"People v. Merchants' Protective Corporation, 189 Cal. 531, 209 Pac. 363 (1922);
Creditors National Clearing House v. Bannwart, 227 Mass. 579, 116 N. E. 886, Ann.
Cas. i9 x8C, 130 (19o7); State ex rel. v. Retail Credit Men's Ass'n of Chattanooga, 163
Tenn. 450, 43 S. W. (2d) 918 (1931).
"'2 Ark. Laws (1929) Art. 182; Cal. (Pol. Code) §§ 4o13 subd. 11, 4115, 4300i (Civ.
Code) §§ 172c, 1296b; Idaho Code (1932) § 3-104; 111. Rev. Stat. (Smith Hurd, 1929)
c. 32, § 411-415; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1933) §§ 30909, 4-36o, 4-3602, 4-3605; La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. (Marr Supp., 1926) §§ 55-56; Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 221, §§ 46-47;
Md. Ann. Code (Bagby, 1924) Art. 27, § ig; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) c. 197, § 10175;
Minn. Laws (1931) c. 114; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929) c. 78, §§ 11692-11693; Mont. Rev.
Code (1935) §§ 8944-9067; N. J. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1924) §§ 52-214p-r (Supp. 1930)
52-214; N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1930) c. 41 §§ 280-28ia; N. D. Comp. Laws (Supp.
1925) § 811, as amended by Laws of 1933, c. 143; Ohio Gen. Code, § 8623-3; Ore.
Code Ann. (193o) §§ 32-5o4, 32-5o6, 22-1213; R. I. Gen. Laws (1923) c. 401, § 6238;
Texas Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1936) Art. 43oa; Utah Laws (1927) c. 78, § 345; Va. Code
1919, § 3422 as amended by Acts 1922, c. 389 sec. 1; Wash. Comp. Stat. (Remington,
1922) § 3231a (applies to trust companies alone); W. Va. Code (1931) c. 3o Art. 2, § 5.
See People ex rel. Committee on Grievances of Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Denver
Clearing House Banks Performing Trust Functions, 99 Co1. 50, 59 P. (2d) 468 (1936),
where corporations were excluded from the practice of law by special rule of the
Supreme Court.
nIn re Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. 607, i8o N. E. 725, 727 (1932): "Statutes
of that nature are valid provided they do not infringe on the right of the judicial
department to determine who shall exercise the privilege of practicing in the courts.
... Where and so far as statutes specify qualifications and accomplishments, they
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When sued, corporations cannot appear "in person" by their own
officers who are not attorneys.12 Nor may they engage in the practice of
law for other persons by hiring attorneys to act for them; 13 and if they
do render the services in violation of this rule, they will not be allowed
to recover compensation.14 Even if all the officers and directors of the
corporation are attorneys, still the corporation will not be permitted to
represent a client through its lawyer-officials.' 5 In the latter situation
the courts point out that as the interest of such officers is subject to
transfer by sale, what was formerly a corporation composed entirely of
lawyers may later become one composed only of lay directors and offi-
cers, with the corporation still retaining the same rights, powers and
duties.
Whether trust companies should be forbidden to draw instruments
which are normally incident to their business, has proved to be a diffi-
will be regarded as fixing the minimum and not as setting bounds beyond which
the judicial department cannot go." Ex parte Stackler, 179 La. 410, 154 So. 41 (1934);
In re Cannon, 2o6 Wis. 374, 240 N. V. 441 (1932).
"Nightingale v. Oregon Central R. Co., 18 Fed. Cas. 239, No. 10, 264 (C. C.
D. Ore. 1873); Bennie v. Triangle Ranch Co., 73 Colo. 586, 216 Pac. 718 (1923);
Nispel v. Western Union R. Co., 64 Ill. 311 (1872); Clark v. Austin, 34o Mo. 467,
'Ol S. W. (2d) 977, 982 (1937): "A corporation is not a natural person. It is an arti-
ficial entity created by law. Being an artificial entity it cannot appear or act in per-
son.... In legal matters, it must act, if at all, through licensed attorneys"; Culpeper
National Bank Inc. v. Tidewater Imp. Co., 119 Va. 73, 89 S. E. 118 (1916). Contra:
Sellent-Repent Corp. v. Queens Borough Gas and Electric Co., 16o Misc. 920, 921,
29o N. Y. S. 887 (1936), Brower, J., holding that a corporation may appear in person
by its officers who are not attorneys when the complaint was subscribed in the cor-
porate name said: "When a corporation does not go outside its own corporate ma-
chinery in the performance of a corporate act, it is acting in person and upon an
equal footing with a natural person, including the right to sue in person."
nPeople v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 209 Pac. 363 (1922); Pacific
Employers Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, io Cal. App. (2d) 592, 52 P. (2d) 992 (1935); Boykin
v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 162 S. E. 796 (1932); In re Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust Co.,
49 Idaho 28o, 288 Pac. 157 (1930), 73 A. L. R. 1323 (1931); In re Otterness, x8i Minn.
254, 232 N. W. 318 (1930), 73 A. L. R. 1319 (1931); In re Co-operative Law Co., 198
N. Y. 4.79, 92 N. E. 15 (1910), 139 Am. St. Rep. 839, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 55 (191), 19
Ann. Cas. 879.
uMidland Credit Adjustment Co. v. Donally, 219 Ill. App. 271 (1926); Collacott
Realty Inc. v. Homuth (Ohio Municipal Ct. Cleveland 1939), 6 U. S. L. Week 761;
Crawford v. McConnell, 173 Okla. 520, 49 P. (2d) 551 (1935). But see United States
Title and Guaranty Co .v. Brown, 166 App. Div. 688, 152 N. Y. S. 470 (1915), where
a corporation which had made a contract with a third person to undertake legal
proceedings in violation of § 28o of the Penal Laws of New York, was permitted to
compel an attorney to account for money in his possession belonging to the corpora-
tion. The court held that public policy would not permit the attorney to profit by
his own wrongful act though the corporation earned the money in the unauthorized
practice of law.
"People ex rel. Los Angeles Bar Ass'n v. California Protective Corp., 76 Cal.
App. 354, 244 Pac. 1089 (1926).
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cult problem for the courts. The cases are uniform, however, in holding
that a trust company may not engage in the supervision and drafting
of complicated legal instruments, such as wills, and trust agreements
of a testamentary nature.' 6
Some courts have taken a rather liberal approach which permits
both corporations by their attorneys, and individuals who are not law-
yers, to draft simple, stereotyped, non-testamentary instruments, pro-
viding no consideration has been charged for such services. 17 Opposed
to this view, however, there is substantial authority holding that neither
the simplicity of the instrument,' 8 nor the fact that a consideration may
or may not have been charged 19 is the controlling factor. Most of these
cases look to see whether legal skill and knowledge have been employed
in the preparation of instruments which secure legal rights.2 0 Trust
agreements, as such, have been held to be complicated instruments the
drafting of which requires legal skill and knowledge. 21 If this view be
followed, then even jurisdictions that permit corporations by their at-
torneys and unlicensed individuals to draft simple, stereotyped instru-
ments would forbid the drawing of trust agreements by corporations.
"'People ex rel. Committee on Grievances of Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Denver Clear-
ing House Bank, 99 Colo. 5o, 59 P. (2d) 468 (1936); In re Eastern Idaho Loan and
Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157 (1930), 73 A. L. R. 1323 (gai); In re Shoe
Manufacturers' Protective Ass'n, 3 N. E. (2d) 746 (Mass. 1936); State ex inf. Miller v.
St. Louis Union Trust Co., 335 Mo. 845, 74 S. W. (2d) 348 (1934); People v. Peoples'
Trust Co., 18o App. Div. 494, 167 N. Y. S. 767 (1917).
1"In re Eastern Idaho Loan and Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157 (1930), 73
A. L. R. 1323 (1931). Cf. In re Matthews, 62 P. (2d) 578 (Idaho 1936); Crawford v.
McConnell, 173 Okla. 520. 49 P. (2d) 551 (1935). See People v. Title Guarantee and
Trust Co., 277 N. Y. 336, 125 N. E. 666, 671 (1919) (concurring opinion); Cain v.
Merchants' Nat. Bk. & Trust Co., 66 N. D. 746, 268 N. W. 719 (1936).
"Clark v. Reardon, 1o4 S. W. (2d) 4o7 (Mo. App. 1937). See People v. Title
Guarantee & Trust Co., 277 N. Y. 336, 125 N. E. 666, 670 (1919) (concurring opinion).
1iDn re Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157 (193o) (court
was concerned with whether the work required the application of a legally trained
mind); People v. Association of Real Estate Tax-Payers, 354 Ill. 102, 187 N. E. 823
(1933); Clark v. Reardon, 104 S. W. (2d) 407 (Mo. App. 1937); People v. People's
Trust Co., i8o App. Div. 494, 167 N. Y. S. 767 (1917); Ferris v. Snively, 172 Wash.
167, 19 P. (2d) 942 (1933), 90 A. L. R. 278 (1934).
21Boykin v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 162 S. E. 796 (1932); In re Eastern Idaho Loan
& Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157 (1930), 73 A. L. R. 1323 (1931); Ely v. Miller,
7 Ind. App. 529, 34 N. E. 836 (1893); Matter of Pace, 170 App. Div. 818, 156 N. Y. S.
641 (1915); In re Duncan, 83 S. C. 186, 65 S. E. 210 (1909), 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 750
(igio), 18 Ann. Cas. 657 (1911).
"Cain et al. v. Merchants Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo, 66 N. D. 746, 268
N. W. 719, 723, 724 (1936): "The drawing of complicated legal instruments such as
wills or trust agreements require more legal knowledge than is possessed by the
average layman.... One who draws such instruments for others practices law even
though such instruments might, to some extent, be incident to a business such as
that usually conducted by trust companies."
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In the case of Merrick v. American Security and Trust Company,22
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by a
two to one decision, recently held that a trust company organized to
carry on a fiduciary business as "executor, administrator, trustee, guar-
dian, agent, custodian, and manager," was not engaged in the practice
of law by drafting simple, nontestamentary trust agreements, where the
corporation was named a party in the instrument. The court's position
was that the company should be permitted to draw such instruments as
are "incidental to the authorized business" of a trust company. This
decision represents a definite departure from the usual holding that a
trust company may not draft trust agreements. Cases taking the more
restrictive position hold that a trust company cannot participate in the
drafting of trust agreements by its own attorney-employees, 23 although
the trust company may take all necessary steps, legal or otherwise, in
the execution of such trust agreements once the instrument has been
drawn and the company made a party thereto 2 4
Besides being contrary to the weight of authority, the holding in
the American Security case, is questionable because of the nature of the
case authority relied upon by the prevailing justices. Two of the cases
cited as supporting the rule there adopted did so only by way of dicta,25
2107 F. (2d) 271 (D. C. App. 1939), cert. denied, 6o S. Ct. 380 (x94o). The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, a six-judge court, now sits in
"divisions" of three judges.
13People ex rel. Committee on Grievances of Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Denver Clear-
ing House Bank, 99 Colo. 50, 59 P. (2d) 468 (1936); In re Eastern Idaho Loan and
Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157 (193o), 73 A. L. R. 1323 (1931); In re Shoe
Manufacturers' Protective Ass'n, 3 N. E. (2d) 746 (Mass. 1936); State ex inf. Miller v.
St. Louis Union Trust Co., 335 Mo. 845, 74 S. W. (2d) 348 (1934); People v. People's
Trust Co., i8o App. Div. 494, 167 N. Y. S. 767 (1917).
"Where statutes authorize trust companies to act as executors and administra-
tors, the companies may, after being so appointed, take such action by their own
attorneys as is necessary to probate the will, or carry out the trust agreement. De-
troit Bar Ass'n v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 282 Mich. 216, 276 N. W. 365 (1937);
Judd v. City Trust and Savings Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N. E. (2d) 288 (1937). Con-
tra: In re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N. W. 318, 320 (1930), 73 A. L. R. 1319,
1322 (1931), 15 Minn. L. Rev. 107: "An executor, administrator, or guardian, as such,
has no right to conduct probate proceedings, except in matters where his personal
rights as representative are concerned, as, for instance, where his account as repre-
sentative is in question, or misconduct is charged against him as representative."
21People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 227 N. Y. 366, 125 N. E. 666 (1919) was
cited by the majority as holding that a trust company might draft such instruments
as are "incidental to the authorized business of the corporation." All the case actually
held, however, was that a corporation might draw such simple instruments as lay-
men in the state were permitted to draw, if there was no pretense or simulation to
the character of an attorney by such corporation, as the giving of legal advice. Childs
v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 Atl. 883 (1934), cited as authority that real estate brokers
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while another hinged on the peculiar construction of a local statute
which was not involved in the American Security case.26 Three other
cases relied upon are equally weak as authority on the point for which
they were cited.27
The position taken by Mr. Justice Stephens in his dissenting opin-
ion in Merrick v. American Security and Trust Company,2s that the
drafting of trust agreements by trust companies did constitute the cor-
porate practice of the law, unquestionably represents the majority view
on the question in this country.29 The view of the dissent was that the
may draw such instruments as are incidental to their business, did not contain such
a holding by that court. The actual holding of the case found a stenographer guilty
of the practice of law by drawing legal instruments for hire. The dictum of the
court on the point dealing with real estate brokers was in response to briefs filed
amici curiae by such brokers, but did not constitute a holding by the court.
^4Detroit Bar Ass'n v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 282 Mich. 216, 276 N. W. 865
(1937) permitted the drafting of revocable trust agreements by a trust company; but
it should be noted that as the legislature had granted certain specific exemptions from
its prohibition of the corporate practice of law, the court felt it had no power to in-
tervene unless the practice of law by such corporations took place in one of the courts
of the state. Even this is not a majority view on the point involved. Other states hav-
ing similar statutes have held that it is a judicial function, not a legislative power, to
determine what amounts to the practice of law; and in so far as the legislature at-
tempts to grant trust companies the right to practice law, such a law is unconstitu-
tional. People ex rel. v. People's Stock Yard Bank, 344 II. 462, 176 N. E. 9o (1931)-
People ex rel. Motorists Ass'n, 354 Ill 595, 188 N. E. 827 (1933); In re Opinion of the,
Justices, 18o N. E. 725 (1932); Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, 55
R. I. 122, 179 AtI. 139 (1935), 1oo A. L. R. 226 (1936).
2"Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jones, 13o S. W. (2d) 945 (Mo. 1939), was relied
upon for the holding that an insurance company could have its lay adjusters fill out
and obtain releases on claims by third parties against their insured; yet the court
pointed out that what the adjuster did in the settlement of claims bore no relation to
the practice of law since the adjuster did not purport to advise any claimant on his
legal rights but merely made a statement of the amount the company would settle the
claim for; that the interests of the claimant and the adjuster instead of being confi-
dential (as in attorney-client relation) were actually adverse. Cain et al. v. Merchants
National Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo, 66 N. D. 746, 268 N. W%. 719 (1936) was cited
to show that a trust company drafting simple instruments was not representing that
it gave legal advice. The case actually held, however, that trust agreements were-
complicated instruments and one who drew them was engaged in the practice of law
even though such instruments might, to some extent, be incidental to the business
transacted, such as a trust business. Judd v. City Trust & Savings Bank, 133 Ohio St-
81, 12 N. E. (2d) 288 (1937) is not authority for the proposition for which it was cited,
that in performing the legal phases of a trust business, attorney-employees of a trust
company are acting for their employer. For this case also holds that the drafting of
trust agreements requires the exercise of legal skill and knowledge for the customers
of the bank who want such instruments drawn. Drawing such instruments by trust
companies is the unauthorized practice of law even though the trust company is
named trustee in the instrument drawn.
2o107 F. (2d) 271, 278 (D. C. App. 1939).
- People ex rel. Committee on Grievances of Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Denver Clear-
ing House Bank Performing Trust Functions, 99 Colo. 50, 59 P. (2d) 468 (1936); In
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criterion for judging whether a trust company's activities constitute the
practice of law should be: "Does the legal service rendered (whether
advice, or the determination whether to use an instrument and if so
what should be the nature and contents thereof) require in a substan-
tial sense the knowledge and judgment of a lawyer; and is it rendered
in whole or in part to a customer of the corporation rather than solely
to the corporation." 30
-Collecting agencies which solicit claims for collection for a fixed
fee, where no resort to the courts is had in the enforcement of such
claims, are held not to be engaged in the corporate practice of the
law.31 They may not, however, employ the services of an attorney in
putting the claim through the courts without falling into the pro-
hibited field of corporate law practice.32 The courts point out that if
an incorporated collection agency engages an attorney to sue on a claim
placed with it for collection, its inability as a corporation to practice
law requires that the relation of attorney and client be established be-
tween the attorney employed and the dreditor, rather than between
agency and creditor with the attorney acting as a mere employee of the
agency.33 It makes no difference that the charter of incorporation au-
thorizes the collecting agency to employ attorneys in order to collect
the claims of third parties.3 4 Attempts by collection agencies to evade
the rule against corporate practice of law by having the creditor make
re Eastern Idaho Loan and Trust Co., 49 Idaho 28o, 288 Pac. 157 (1930), 73 A. L. R.
1323 (1931); State ex inf. Miller v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 335 Mo. 845, 74 S. W.
(2d) 348 (1934); Cain et al, v. Merchants Nat. Bank and Trust Co., 66 N. D. 746,
268 N. W. 719 (1936); Judd v. City Trust and Savings Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N. E.
(2d) 288 (1937).
3MMerrick v. American Security and Trust Company, 1o7 F. (2d) 271, 284 (D. C.
App. 1939)-
3TNeander v. Tillman, 232 App. Div. 189, 249 N. Y. S. 559 (1931); In the Matter
of the Application of Associated Lawyers' Co., 134 App. Div. 350, 119 N. Y. S. 77
(1939); Public Service Traffic Bureau v. Haworth Marble Co., 4
o Ohio App. 255, 178
N. E. 703 (1931); Kendrick v. State, 218 Ala. 277, 120 So. 142 (1928); State v. James
Sanford'Agency, 167 Tenn. 339, 69 S. W. (2d) 895 (1934).
*2People ex rel. Los Angeles Bar Ass'n v. California Protective Corp., 76 Cal. App.
354, 244 Pac. 1089 (1926); Creditors National Clearing House v. Bannwart, 227 Mass.
579, 116 N. E. 886 (1917), Ann. Cas. 1918C 13o; Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men v. Bar
Ass'n of the City of Richmond, 167 Va. 327, 189 S. E. 153 (1937).
wState ex rel. Retail Credit Men's Ass'n of Chattanooga, 163 Tenn. 450, 43 S. W.
(2d) 918 (1931); Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men v. Bar Ass'n of the City of Richmond,
167 Va. 327, 189 S. E. 153 (1937).
"People v. California Protective Corp., 76 Cal. App. 354, 244 Pac. 1089 (1926);
People v. Merchants' Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 209 Pac. 363 (1922); In re Eastern
Idaho Loan 8: Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 175 (1930), 73 A. L. R. 1323 (1931);
Creditors' National Clearing House v. Bannwart, 227 Mass. 579, 116 N. E. 886 (1917),
Ann. Cas. 1918C 13o; State ex rel. v. Retail Credit Men's Ass'n of Chattanooga, 163
Tenn. 450, 43 S. W. (2d) 918 (1931).
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an assignment of the claim to the agency for collection, where no con-
sideration is paid for the assignment and the agency merely retains its
fee after collection and sends the balance to the creditor, have been
equally unavailing. 35 The proper course open to the agency after its
demands for payment from the debtor have failed, has been pointed
out in the case of State ex rel. McKittrick v. C. S. Dudley & Co. Inc.3 6
The court there said:
"If collections cannot be made without the services of an at-
torney, the respondent [collection agency] should return the
claim to the creditor who should be free to select and employ his
own attorney. The respondent should not engage directly or in-
directly, in the business of employing an attorney for others to
collect claims or to prosecute suits therefor, nor have any inter-
est in the fee earned by the attorney for his work."
The case authority which exists on the subject of the corporate
practice of the law still dearly denies a corporation the right to prac-
tice law. Only when the corporation is the real party in interest to the
litigation may its own attorney-employees handle the case in the courts
for the corporation. Some writers suggest that the reason for the rule
denying the corporation the right to practice law no longer exists, be-
cause a court could very well subject corporations to the same require-
ments as are now imposed upon attorneys, thereby eliminating any
possibility of an unfair advantage being taken of the dient.37 Others,
however, feel that the advent of the corporation into the field of the
practice of law would be utterly destructive of the essential personal
element.
38
It would seem that if corporations practicing law could be held to
the same rigid requirements as are now imposed upon attorneys, the
possibility of public sentiment demanding that they be permitted to
practice may ultimately prevail. And this for the reason that a cor-
mState ex rel. McKittrick v. C. S. Dudley & Co. Inc., 340 Mo. 852, 1o2 S. W. (2d)
895 (1937); State ex rel. Freeboum v. Merchants' Credit Service, 1O4 Mont. 76, 66 P.
(2d) 337 (1937); State v. James Sanford Agency, 167 Tenn. 339, 69 S. W. (2d) 895
(1934). Cf. Mutual Bankers Corp. v. Covington Bros. & Co., 277 Ky. 33, 125 S. W.
(2d) 202 (1939).
-"34o Mo. 852, 1O2 S. IW. (2d) 895, 902 (1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 693, 58 S. Ct.
12, 82 L. ed. 535 (1937).
m(1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1114, 1118: "The fear that the entrance of corporations
into the field of law will cause a lowering of the standards of the bar is derived
largely from the impersonal nature of such organizations. But it would not be im-
practicable to impose the same requirements on corporations that are now imposed
on private attorneys."
ujackson, The Establishment of Cordial Relations Between the Bar and the Cor-
porate Fiduciary (1938) 5 Law and Contemp. Prob. 80.
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porate law organization would be able to render a specialized form of
:service at a reduced fee, due to the volume of business transacted. The
allowance of corporate practice could not be accomplished by statutory
,enactment alone, in view of the present holdings of the courts that
theirs is the inherent power to say who may practice law.39 Indicative
-of the care with which courts guard their authority is the holding in
-Ex parte Stackler.40 There an act of the state legislature which gave
the graduate of a state university law school the right to practice law
automatically on receiving his degree was incorporated into the state
constitution by amendment. The court held, however, that this amend-
ment did not deprive the supreme court of the state of the right to de-
mand further proof of qualifications by requiring such applicant to
take the state bar examination. The court purported to obviate the
constitutional problem by saying it could have required higher stand-
ards than those set by the legislature, and the mere putting of such a
statute into the form of a constitutional amendment gave it no greater
-efficacy than a legislative enactment. It would seem, however, that since
-courts may be created or abolished by constitutional amendment, so
may their powers be curtailed by the amending process.
41
Lzsu D. PRicE
3in re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N. E. 313 (1935); Ex parte
Stackler, 179 La. 410, 154 So. 41 (1934).
40179 La. 410, 154 So. 41 (igs4)-
'1 In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240 N. W. 441 (1932).
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